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P ieter van Dam’s words, taken fromhis voluminous study of the Dutch
East Indies Company (around 1700),2
may surprise a modern reader. At the
time of writing, the Company, or VOC,
was at the height of its administrative
and commercial efficiency and had
explored all commercial opportunities in
the region during the preceding century.
Still, the judgment of van Dam rings with
diffidence toward the Portuguese, who
had been expelled from the Malay Penin-
sula in 1641 and relegated from Makas-
sar in 1660, but here stand out as a pow-
erful entity in the Timor region. 
The stubborn resilience of the Por-
tuguese in what was perhaps their most
inaccessible overseas domain raises a
number of questions. How were they
able to dominate large parts of Timor
and (until 1859) the surrounding islands
in the face of the much better-equipped
and organised Dutch? What did Timor
mean to the Portuguese network in
Asia? What were the decisive stages in
the division of Timor, whose conse-
quences are apparent to this day? The
resilience of the Portuguese authority in
East Timor has been characterised as a
miracle, but it might be more fitting to
call it a ‘paradox’. The Portuguese pres-
ence, for all its problems and perceived
exploitative features, was in the end able
to implement symbols and perceptions
that in more recent history thwarted the
Indonesian integrationist project. Por-
tuguese representatives on Timor were
frequently on the brink of expulsion,
obliteration or resignation, but nonethe-
less hung on until 1975.
How did they get there 
in the first place?
The origins of the Dutch-Portuguese
bipartition of Timor have recently been
addressed by Arend de Roever (2002).3
In his thesis, de Roever contextualises
Timor by tracing the importance of the
sandalwood trade that opened the island
to the evolving commercial networks of
the 16th and 17th centuries. In this way
Timor, for all its marginality, became a
part of the developing and increasingly
interlinked world system (described by,
for example, Immanuel Wallerstein).4
At the same time he points out the lim-
its of contact dictated by Timor’s geog-
raphy. Winds and currents make its
coasts inaccessible for much of the year,
while its mountainous and dry interior
limits manpower resources and food
production. De Roever argues that the
Dutch could very well have eliminated
Portuguese influence in Timor after
1613 but failed to do so owing to other
priorities in central Indonesia. Thus the
VOC provided the Portuguese with sev-
eral decades of breathing room. When
the VOC resumed its interest in Timor
in the mid-17th century, they found that
the Portuguese could not be dislodged.
All this deserves to be the subject of an
in-depth study of how indigenous soci-
eties responded to the impact of early
modern colonialism (16th to 18th cen-
turies), and how they participated in the
processes that led to the rough 50-50
partition of Timor known to modern his-
tory. The annual records of the VOC post
in Kupang in West Timor constitute a
comprehensive body of material from
the 1650s to the 1790s. The Portuguese
material is less well-preserved but
includes a substantial number of partly-
published clerical and secular sources of
the 16th century and later. Timorese oral
traditions, recorded since the 19th cen-
tury, can be used from a posthumous
perspective to clarify how events or
processes were perceived by indigenous
groups.
Colonial seeds of division
From these materials a few points can
be made, which may be elaborated by
future research. First, the localisation
of the Portuguese group clearly
explains much of their resilience. This
is by no means unique to the Timorese
situation; Malyn Newitt (2005) has
recently stressed the role of mestiço
populations in the preservation of var-
ious Portuguese domains in Africa and
Asia.5 It has also been pointed out that
such communities were in themselves
important prerequisites to engaging
with local populations in trade and
diplomacy. The Topasses, or Black Por-
tuguese, a mestiço community, estab-
lished a martial and self-confident cul-
ture in Larantuka (East Flores) and
Timor in the late 16th and early 17th
centuries. They were so firmly attached
to Dominican fathers that they resisted
attempts to introduce Jesuit fathers
into the region. In letters, Topass lead-
ers consistently appear as good
Catholic subjects of the King of Portu-
gal, though it is clear that they at the
same time pursued their own political
ways and adopted (or rather inherited)
many local customs.
By the late 17th century the Topasses
dominated most of Timor, save for an
enclave around Kupang where the
Dutch led a precarious existence. Topass
leaders were able to profit from the trade
of sandalwood and other commodities,
such as beeswax and slaves, capitalising
on the 1661 Dutch-Portuguese peace
treaty. Portuguese Macau was the main
economic channel to the outside world.
The Topass elite consolidated the many
minor Timorese principalities by way of
matrimonial alliances, the establish-
ment of minor ‘colonies’, and outright
threats. The Dutch adversaries were
often stunned by the power that Por-
tuguese and Catholic symbols of author-
ity possessed over the local Timorese
aristocrats, given the rather superficial
dissemination of Catholicism. Sources
hint that the locals incorporated such
symbols in their own universe of con-
notations. The concept of hegemony
might be applicable to the situation of
Portuguese Timor to a certain extent –
a system where opposition and differ-
ence are not overtly repressed but rather
co-opted in a social order.
Until a century ago colonial ‘rule’ on
Timor was a matter of indirect gover-
nance. The number of whites in the Por-
tuguese trading port of Lifau, in West
Timor, was no more than 50 in 1689,
and the number of Dutch burgers in
Kupang was likewise limited. For the
Portuguese and Dutch alike, it was
essential to bind local aristocracies to
their interests through institutionalised
exchange of gifts or goods. Over the
three centuries of colonial intrusion, the
resources and organisational structure
of Timorese principalities, far from
remaining in a pristine, changeless
state, were transformed by the dissemi-
nation of firearms and the changing for-
tunes of the sandalwood trade.
East and west and why
This localised order constructed during
the 17th century was disrupted by the
persistent attempts of the Portuguese
Estado da India (Indian administration)
to integrate Timor in its own hierarchy
beginning in 1702. For long periods in
the 18th century a bitter struggle raged
between Topass leaders and centrally-
appointed administrators, in which
local principalities became entangled.
Finally, in 1769, the official governor
had to leave Lifau, the traditional Por-
tuguese stronghold in West Timor, and
establish a new residence in Dili in the
east. Only in the 1780s did a reconcili-
ation between the Topasses and the gov-
ernor take place. By then, however,
trade with Macau had begun to decline
due to insecure conditions on the
island. A consequence of the shift from
Lifau to Dili was a rough division of
colonial spheres of interest reflected on
today’s map. The colonialists estab-
lished closer contact with the eastern
principalities that had hitherto been
rather vaguely dependent. Meanwhile,
the remaining Topass-dominated area
transformed into the Oecusse Ambeno
enclave, which, although situated in
western Timor, today belongs to Timor
Leste.
A second factor in the story of Timor’s
division is Dutch cautiousness. The
trading post of Kupang, founded in 1653,
was an almost constantly troubled post,
and seems to have been maintained in
order to keep an eye on the Portuguese.
Surrounded by three (and later five)
small but loyal allied principalities, the
Dutch staged three ambitious military
campaigns against Portuguese clients in
the 1650s, which ended dismally. After
that, they remained on the defensive for
almost a century. Dutch residents were
instructed not to interfere in internal
Portuguese disputes but rather to ‘let
them both jump in the bay’. Portugal’s
close affiliation to Britain after the 1703
Methuen Treaty apparently reinforced
the VOC’s commitment to relieving
diplomatic strain. Nevertheless, this
period ended with a major Topass inva-
sion of VOC lands in 1749; in the well-
known battle of Penfui, the Topasses
and their clients were slaughtered in the
thousands by a small ‘Dutch’ force (that
included very few whites).
After Penfui one can discern a brief
period of Dutch expansionism. Numer-
ous principalities on the western half
of the island changed allegiance almost
overnight. Though some of them soon
strayed from the Dutch cause, this was
an important stage in the shaping of
the political map of modern Timor.
VOC ambitions were at their height in
1761, when the resident Hans Albrecht
von Plüskow wished to use internal
Portuguese dissension to once and for
all establish Dutch authority through-
out the unruly island. The attempt was
not quite endorsed by Batavia and mis-
fired badly; Von Plüskow was mur-
dered by the Topasses and the whole
enterprise immediately imploded. Sub-
sequent residents had little power or
energy to deal with the various rebel-
lions, or the machinations of the Por-
tuguese, as it was a time of general
financial and administrative decline for
the VOC. 
Thus by the time of the dissolution of
the VOC in 1799, the situation was as
follows. In East Timor, an economically
weak but moderately stabilised colonial
apparatus managed to co-opt a weak-
ened Topass community. In West Timor
a fragile outpost of a crumbling colonial
empire desperately tried to keep self-
willed local principalities within their
alliance system. In spite of British inter-
vention during the Napoleonic era, this
rough division of power lasted hence-
forth, and was cemented through
Dutch-Portuguese diplomatic agree-
ments in 1851, 1859 and 1916. <
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Colonial rivalry and 
the partition of Timor
What the islands deliver is in the first place sandalwood, and also some gold and beeswax.... The
inhabitants...who often wage war on each other, sometimes draw the Company into the game..., the reason why
we sometimes achieve some slaves.... But since the relation with Portugal is at peace again...we have and keep
only a small activity on Timor as well as Solor, pending the small trade that is done here, and also because the
Portuguese have drawn everything to themselves, being by far the strongest and mostly having the inhabitants
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